Abstracts of Recent Decisions by Editors,
ABSTRACTS OF RECENT DECISIONS.
ing the case from the jury, by the instruction given on its own
motion. It was in the nature of a demurrer to the evidende pre-
dicated on all the facts detailed in evidence before the jury on
both sides. If a plaintiff makes out a case upon which he can
go to the jury, the court has no right after the defence is in to
assume it to be true, and require the jury to find for the defend-
ant, or, which is the same thing, to declare that upon the'wholo
case the plaintiff is not entitled to recover. Assuming, however,
that the court's instruction was based alone upon the plaintiff's
case, it was not proper thus to take the case from the jury. The
facts given in evidence by the plaintiff, if true, it seems to me
made out a primd facie cafe, and the jury ought to have been
suffered to pass upon them.
Judgment reversed and cause remanded.
ABSTRACTS OF RECENT AMERICAN DECISIONS.
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AGENT.
Fr.dence of Agenec/-Province of the Court and Jury as to a Question
of Agenc.-The declarations of a broker or of an agent are not per se
evidence of agency; but when evidence of facts tending to show that
the relation of principal and agent existed, has been offered directly or
circumstantially, it is then the province of the jury to determine whether
there is such proof of agency as to make the declarations of the sup-
posed agent binding on the principal: National Afechanics' Bank v.
National Bank of Baltimore, 36 Md.
The declarations of an agent are not admissible to bind the principal
until the agency is established; but where there is evidence of agency,
although not full and satisfactory, such evidence should be submitted to
the jury who are the exclusive judges of its weight: Id.
It is not the province of the court to determine the question of agency
I From W. C. Webb, Esq., Reporter; to appear in 10 Kansas Rep.
2 From J. S. Stockett, Esq., Reporter; to appear in 36 Md. Rep.
s From the Judges; to appear in 51 N. H. Rep.
4 From C. E. Green, Esq., Reporter; to appear in vol. 8 of his reports.
6 From Hon. 0. L. Barbour, Reporter; to appear in vol. 36 of his reports.
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vd non; but to decide whether there is any evidence tending to prove
agency : Id.
AMENDMENT.
In fu'thera.ncc of Justice.-Where a party had obtained, through
legal proceedings. an unjust advantage, and in these proceedings, has
made -% nistake, be it ever so trivial, the law will not tolerate an aniend-
ment to secure him in his advantage: .renan v. Scott. 10 Kans.
When it is in furtherance of justice, the law looks tolerantly on aiis-
takes, and seeks to uphold whatever is hone-tly attempted to be done: ld.
Where a defendant has not been regularly served by summons or
Dublication of notice, the record cannot be amended after judgment so
as to bring him into court and sustain the judznent : Id.
But where a defendant has been regularly served, and there is simrl'y
a defect in the return of the officer, or the proof of publication, that
defect can be cured by amendment, so as to conform to the flcts : rd.
AUCTION. See Frauds, Statute of.
BAILIENT.
Conrmodatum.-A. loaned a sulky and harness, the fornier the pro-
perty of his father, to B.. to drive and exercise his horse over the track
of the Fair grounds of an Agricultural Society. Whilst so driving, the
horse ran away and broke, and greatly injured or desrroyed hli articles
loaned. Held. that the lender, though not the owner of the sulky, could
maintain an action against the borrower to recover its value, and such
recovery could be pleaded in bar by him in a subsequent suit by the
owner: Casey v. Suter. 36 Md.
BANKRUPTCY.
Assignee in Bankruptcy-Construction. of tle Bankruptcy? Act.-A
juduieut for $13.78. &c., was recovered by a bankrupt prior to his
becoming such, on the 8th of July 1S67. The suit in which the judg-
ment was recovered, was commenced on the 18th of September, 1861,
3n a promi-sory note, dated 2d of April 1861, for *153.78. Afterwards,
by order of the court., passed on the 22d of April 1870, the original
judgment was ainended and entered for the umn of $153.78, &c. The
conveyance of the property of the bankrupt to his assignee, was
made on the 15th of June 1869. In a suit by the assignee of the
bankrupt to recover on this judgment, his right to maintain the action
was denied upon the ground that the judgnient being subsequent in date
, the as.-ignment, was not conveyed thereby. hut was the property or
the bankrupt. Held:
1-t. That the cause of action and the original judgment thereon,
heinz antecedent to the application in bankruptcy, and to the a-;goi-
nmeat. pa.-ed by operation of law to the assignce, subject to the right of
the b:ankrupt to have the jud-znent altered and corrected.
2l. That the subsequent action of the court, increasing the amount of
the judgment, did not in any nanner impair the right or obligation of
the aztsiguce to sue for and recover the amount as finally ascertained:
Zintzhnqr; v. RIUlM. Assiqpire. 36 Md.
Tihe provision of' $,he Act of Congresi, establishing a uniform systeni
if baukruptcy, which prescribes that as soon as the asignee is appointed
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and qualified, the judge or register shall by an instrument under is
7iand, assign and convey to such assignee all the estate, real and personal,
of the bankrupt, is merely directory, and the signature of the judge is
not essential to the assignment, where some equally formal mode has
been adopted, sanctioned by the seal of the court, which imports verity,
and gives authenticity to all the judicial acts of the judge : Id.
The right of an assignee of a bankrupt to sue for and recover a
debt due the bankrupt prior to his bankruptcy, does not depend upon
the instrument of assignment prescribed by the bankrupt act; such
right is vested in him in virtue of the adjudication of bankruptcy, and
his appointment as assignee: Id.
An instrument of writing purporting to assign under the Act of Con-
gress, establishing a uniform system of bankruptcy, all the property of
a bankrupt to the assignee therein named, certified by the clerk of the
District Court of the United States, for the District of Virginia, under
the seal of his court to be a true copy of the original assignment on file
in his office, is admissible in evidence, and sufficient to show the as-
signee's right to sue in behalf of the bankrupt's estate : Id
CoMMoN CARRIER.
Contract to carry beyond Carrier's own Route-Conflict of Laws.-The
defendants, who were common carriers between P. and B., carried from
P. to B. a parcel directed to R., a place beyond their route, and deli-
vered it to the next carrier according to the usage of the business, and
the parcel was lost beyond B. The judge who tried the facts did not
find an undertaking of the defendants for carriage beyond B., and there-
upon gave a general verdict for the defendants. Hle&d, that there was
no ground for setting aside the verdict: G-ray v. Jackson, 51 N. H.
When a contract is made by a common carrier in one state to trans-
port goods from that state into another, and the goods are lost, the rights
of the parties are governed by the law of the state in which the loss
happens: Id.
CONFLICT Op LAWS. See Common Carrier.
CONSTABLE.
Action by.-A constable has such an interest in property upon which
he has levied by virtue of executions, as will enable him to maintain an
action to recover the possession thereof from one who has purchased
the same of the defendant in the executioni, after levy: Rue v. Perry,
63 Barb.
Void Process.-Tbe rule justifying an officer in the seizure of pro.
perty under executions good on their face, but really void as to the
party, for want of jurisdiction, is intended to be a rule of protection
merely : Id.
Although an officer may defend under such process, he cannot build
up a title upon it so as to maintain actions against third'persons: Id.
CONSTITUTIONA5 LAW.
Power of legislature to bind its Successors-Action-Rigit to contest
an Election not a vested Right Eidence in contested Elections.-The
ordinary effect of a repeal of a statute is to put an end to all proceed
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ings under it, pending and undetermined: Gillitand et al. v. ScofYler et
aL, 10 Kans.
In matters of pure legislation, and where nothing results in tle nat;re
of contract or vested rights, no one legislature can bind another: ..
The right to contest an election is not a vebted right. Given by one
legislature it may be taken away by another : Id.
Chapter 104 of the General Statutes has a prospective appliction.
and until repealed prescribes the rules for determining the effect and
construction of the statutes of each legislatture: PL
The repeal by the legislature of 1871 of the Act of lRG9, for con.
testing an election fbr the location or relocation of county seats. did not
put an end to proceedings in contests then pending under s-iid act: 1,.
On the trial of a contested county-seat election, a witness cannot be
alloned to state what other persons not parties to the record told him
subsequent to the election, as to the nunber of times and the names
under which they claimed to have voted: AN.
Where testimony is erroneouzly received, which may have influenced
the court or jury in the findings or verdict, the error cannot be consi-
dered immaterial: Id.
Mere irregularities on the part of election officers, or their omission
to observe some merely directory provision of the law, will not vitiate
the election : Id.
Unless a fatir consideration of the statute shows that the legislature
intended compliance with the provision in relation to the manner to be
essential to the validity of the proceeding, it is to be regarded as di-
rectory merely: Id.
An election is valid, though there be but two judges appointed or
acting: .d.
That one of the judges was not present at the polls when elected, and
that the clerks were not appointed by the judges, will not vitiate the
election when the judges recoguised the clerks as properly acting, and
both judges and clerks acted during the election, receiving the ballots,
counting the votes and making the returns, without any question by
any one as to their authority. They were at least officers defcto, and
their acts as such officers cannot be questioned collater.lly: ,.
Evidence of a preparation, and an opportunity for and an inclination
to wrong-loing. are not of themselves sufficient to sustain a finding, of such
wrongdoing : ld.
Sections 10, 18, and 64, of the Election Law (Gen. Stat., pp 406,
408 and 420), are directory in their provisions, and a disregard of them
.will not necessarily vitiate an election: Id
Election officers who wilfully neglect or corruptly act in the discharge
of any duty under the election laws are liable to prosecution and pun-
ishment fbr misdemeanor:- Id.
CoirtonATIoN. See Statutes.
COSTS.
Non-resdet--Eadorser of the ff-ri?-An endorser of the writ of a
non-resident is not released by the plaintiff becoming a resident of the
state: Byicood v. Bonion, 51 N. 11.
X return upon a writ of execution of non ese inrentus. or not satisfied,
procured by a defendant in bad faith, and with a fraudulent purpose of
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fixing the endorser, is not such a return as the law contemplates, in
order to fix the endorser: Id.
So long as good faith is observed, the defendant is not bound to active
diligence in collecting his costs of the original plaintiff. Nor is he
bound to take out execution against the body; nor is he necessarily re-
quired to deliver it to the officer in season to make sale of an equity of
redemption in real estate: Id.
COVENANT.
Running with Land- Tarranty-Damages.-Covenants for title run
with the land, enure to the protection of the owner for the time being
of the estate which they are intended to assure, and they may be en-
forced not only by the covenantee and his representatives, but by his
heirs, devisees and alienees: Crisfield v. Storr, 36 AId.
In actions on covenant of warranty it is necessary to prove that the
eviction of the plaintiff was had under a title paramount, and existing
at the date of the covenant, and the narr. must so allege, and if it fail
to do so, it will be held bad on demurrer: Id.
In an action of covenant for title by the assignee of the covenantee,
the measure of damages is the consideration which the assignee paid to
his immediate grantor, with interest from the date of the eviction, and
costs in the ejectment suit; with the limitation, however, that the
amount recovered cannot exceed the consideration received by the cove-
nantor for the same lands : .d.
In an action of covenant of title by the assignee of the covenantee,
counsel fees paid by him in defending the ejectment suit cannot be reco-
vered as part of the damages, he having voluntarily undertaken to defend
his title instead of giving notice to the covenantor or those bound by
the covenant to do so: Id.
Where notice is given to the covenantor or those bound by the cove-
nant., and they refuse to defend the title, the covenantee or his assignee
has the right to employ counsel for that purpose, and may recover in
an action on the covenant such reasonable fees as he has been compelled
to pay: Id.
Where an action is brought on a covenant of warranty against the
heirs of the covenantor, they are jointly liable, and the verdict should
be against them in solido : Id.
In actions on covenants of warranty, limitations do not begin to run
until there is a breach of the covenant: Id.
A covenantee or his assignee who has suffered eviction, is not bound
to seek satisfaction of his claim out of the personal estate of the cove-
nantor before recovery can be had against his heirs: Id.
In an action on warranty of title against the heirs of the covenantor,
by the assignee of the covenantee, the record of the ejectment suit is
admissible as evidence against the defendants, to prove the fact of the
judgment of eviction, although they had received no notice of the
pendency of the suit in ejectment: Id.
DAM.AGES. See Covenant-fo'rtgage.
DOG.
Liability of Owners for Damages by.-Under General Statutes, ch
105, 4 9 the owner or keeper of a dog is liable to the person injured by
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it, for double the damages sustained, whether such owner or keeper had
notice of the vicious habits of the animal or not: Orne v. Roberts, 51
N.H.
The double damages under this statute may be recovered in an action
of debt, without previously determining the actual damages in an action
on the case : Id.
ELECTION. See Constitutional Law.
EQUITY.
Multifarious Bill-Contract to sell-Statute of Frauds.-A bill by a
husband and wife praying performance of one or the other of two agree-
ments, the one a parol agreement made with the husband, and the other
a written agreement made with the wife, both for the conveyance by
the defendant of the same premises upon the same terms, is not multi-
farious: Green and Wife v. Riehards, 8 0. E. Green.
Such bill might have been demurrable for a misjoinder. But here
the error is not such that the court will refuse relief on this technical
objection, after the defendant has allowed the cause to proceed to
hearing: Id.
Taking possession of the premises under a parol agreement for their
conveyance, is such part performance as will take the case out of the
Statute of Frauds and support the suit on the agreement; part payment
will not: Id.
A memorandum endorsed on a receipt &c., as follows: "This is to
show that I agree to sell to )rs. G., house and lot No. 71, Ferry Street,
for the sum of $2500, and that when there is $500 paid and the back
rent, I will give her the deed and take a mortgage for $2000," signed
T. E. R., is a contract certain and definite, except as to whether the
mortgage should draw interest or not, but there being no agreement for
time, and the purchaser not being entitled to any credit, a court of
equity will presume it to have been the intention of the parties that the
mortgage should be made payable on demand, and enforce the con-
tract: Id.
Jurisdiction.-The appearance of a defendant to a bill in equity, con-
fers jurisdiction, unless it be for the sole purpose of setting up the want
of jurisdiction: Merrill v. Hatghton, et al,, 51 N. H.
Therefore, if the party appear and make this objection, and at the
same time demur to the bill for want of equity, the defect of jurisdiction
is cured: Id.
A bill in equity brought to redeem stocks pledged to the defendants.
may be sustained, although they may have sold the stocks; and in case
it be out of their power to return the stocks, the court may in a proper
case decree compensation: Id.
ESTOPPEL. See Grant-Insurance.
Standing by and allowing -Party to expend Mfoney under belief he was
Owner.-When a party purchases land at its full fair value, and suppos-
ing it to be free from encumbrance, erects buildings of considerable
value, and judgment-creditors of the former owner of the land with
knowledge thai the buildings were being erected, and having reason to
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believe that it was done under a mistake, by their silence ana acquies-
cence, fraudulently encourage him to go on and erect his buildings, and
then issue an execution, the sale of the buildings will be restrained:
1Dellette v. Kemble and Others, 8 C. E. Green.
FEE SIMPLE,
Creation of an Estate in Pee-Nature of the Estate conveyed, deter.
mined by the Object to be effected-Declaration of Trust.-Words of
limitation or inheritance are not essential to create an estate in fee, nor
is the nature of the estate conveyed, whether a trust, or use executed,
determined so much by the terms used, as by the object to be effected:
Hawkins v. Chapman, 36 Md.
A deed, after reciting certain judgments, and the fact that they had
been superseded by A. and B., and that 0. was desirous of securing them
against any damage or injury which might arise in consequence of having
become his security, conveyed unto D. "all the right, title and interest
of 0. and wife" in the land described, "in trust for the use and behoof
of the said A. and B.; " with the proviso that if the said 0. should sav6
A. and B. from all damage or injury which might result from having
superseded said judgments, then the deed was to be void, otherwise to
remain in full force and virtue in law. Held, that by virtue of the
intention of the grantors and the ends to be accomplished, the deed con-
veyed to the grantee the legal estate in fee in the lands therein described,
with power to sell and convey for the benefit of the cestuis gue trust on
condition; which being a naked trust, unaccompanied with a beneficial
interest, descended on the death of the grantee to his heir at common
law, as provided by the Act of 1831, ch. 311, § 11: Id.
FRAUDS, STATUTE OF.
Bids for several Articles at an Auction Sale one Contract- endoi 's
Lien.-Plaintiff sold the furniture in his hotel and his stable stock at the
same auction and upon the same terms and conditions, and defendant
purchased a large number of separate articles upon as many separate
bids and at separate and distinct prices, many of which were less than
$33. This was regarded as an entire contract for the whole of the
property thus purchased by the defendant at the aggregate price, and
will thus be within the Statute of Frauds, if the aggregate price exceeds
$33: ,Jenness et al. v. Wendell, 51 N. H.
In such case a delivery and acceptance of a part of the goods, will.
take the entire contract out from the rperation of the Statute of Frauds:
Id.
And it would make no difference whether the sale was completed in
one day or extended through two or more days: 1d.
Where the terms of the sale are "cash on delivery," the vendor may
hold a lien upon the property until the price is paid if he chooses, o
he may waive the payment and his lien, in which case the title to the
property will vest in the purchaser from the time of th sale : Id.
A declaration for goods sold and delivered may be amended by adding
a count for the same goods bargained and sold, without changing the
form or the cause of action.
GRANT.
Where a grantor with warranty has no title to the premises conveyed
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the date of the conveyance, if he subsequently acquires an estatf.
aerein, such acquired estate will enure to the benefit of the grantee;
f not by estoppel, it will upon the principle of avoiding circuity of
etion : Te.ifft v. Munson et al., 63 Barb.
A mere grant operates upon the possession; it simply conveys the
,-state and interest which the grantor had in the premises granted. If
be grantor had no estate, there is no estate to be accepted; so that on
the conveyance by grant only of lands, by, deed or mortgage, the grantee
is not estopped from averring that his grantor had nothing in the lands
granted : -1d.
But where the conveyance is by warranty the rule is different. In
tha, case the warranty will rebut and bar the grantor and his heirs of a
future right; not because a title ever passes by huch a grant, but the
principle of avoiding circuity of action interposes and prevents the
grantor from impeaching a title, to the soundness of which he must
answer on his warranty: Id.
HIGHWAY.
Invalid laying.out.-Where the petition for a highway made a
stake and stones in an existing highway one of the termii, and the
road laid out struck this hihway more than one hundred rods north-
erly of that ter.,ninus, and then over that highway to that bound, it
was held that this was such a departure from the highway prayed for,
as to render the laying-out invalid: Flanders v. Coi.ebiook, 51 N. H.
HUSBAND AND WIFE.
Liability of Wife spon Notes.-The obligation of a married woman,
except in the cases where her separate property is involved, is void:
an sel v. De l1itt, 63 Barb.
A married woman is not liable upon a promissory note signed by her
as surety for another, or upon one given in renewal thereot, although
she has a separate estate; where there is nothing to show a charge, or
an intent to charge such estate, or that her estate was benefited, and
no evidence (except by implication) to show that the note was given
upon the credit of such estate: Id.
]VIen a Husband 2nay sue in his own Name, to enforce a Contract re-
dating to his Wife's Property.-Where a married man under a contract
to pay him individually, one-half of the expense, erects a divi.-ional
fence between the lands of his wife and those of an adjoining proprietor,
he is entitled to sue in his own name to recover the amount, notwitlistand-
in- he may have acted as the agent of his wife in having the fence
erected: Wilson. v. Sands, 36 Md.
INSURANCE.
Fire Insurance-Tmplied Waiver-Estoppel-Construction of Clauses
it a Poliy of Insurance against Fire-Builder's Risk--Evidence of
insurable nterest.-Where the preliminary proofs of the loss by fire of
property insured are furnished to the insurance company withir, a
reasonable time, and no objection is then made to such proofs or to tho
absence of a certificate required of the' insured by a condition of the
I1,-v. and the insurance company months afterwards refuses to pay tbh
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loss under the policy upon other and distinct grounds, and at the time
of such refusal makes no objection to the proofs of loss, or to the
absence of the certificate, it will be estopped in an action on the policy,
to set up and rely upon such objections, notwithstanding the policy pro-
vides that "nothing but a distinct specific agreement, clearly expressed
and endorsed on the policy, shall operate as a waiver of any printed or
written condition, warranty or restriction therein :" Franklin Fire ns.
Co. v. Chicago Ice Co., 36 Md.
A clause in a policy of insurance against fire, that " nothing but a
distinct specific agreement, clearly expressed and endorsed on the policy,
shall operate as a waiver of any printed or written condition, warranty or
restriction therein," refers to those conditions and provisions of the
policy which enter into and form a part of the contract of insurance,
and are essential to make it a binding contract between the parties, and
which are properly designated as conditions ; it has no reference to those
stipulations which are to be performed after a loss has occurred, such as
giving notice and furnishing preliminary proofs of the loss : 11.
Where from the character and structure of a building insured, and
the use made of it, it is necessary to employ workmen the year round
to repair, and keep it in thorough condition for the business to which it
is appropriated, such employment of workmen thereon does not vitiate
the policy under the memorandum printed thereon, entitled "Builder's
Risk," which provides that "the working of carpenters, roofers, tin-
smiths, gas-fitters, plumbers or other mechanics in building, altering or
repairing the premises named in this policy, will vitiate the same, unless
permission for such work be endorsed in writing hereon :" Id.
The true intention of this article in the policy is to prohibit such
hazardous use of the building insured, as is generally denominated
"buibler's risk," which arises from placing it in the possession, or under
the control of workmen for rebuilding, alteration or repairs; it does not
refer to such repairs as are indispensable to the proper conduct of thE
business to which the building is appropriated: Id.
A person in possession of property, claiming and occupying it as its
owner, is prima facie presumed to be seised in fee; and in absence of
any proof of an outstanding title in others, or of any encumbrance upol
the property, this primdfacie presumption is sufficient to show an insur
able interest therein : Id.
INTERNATIONAL LAW. See Judgment.
JUDGMENT.
Action on Judgment-J'udgment is Contract.-An action can be main-
tained on a domestic judgment in this state: Burns et al. v. Simpson e
al., 10 Kans.
In an action on a domestic judgment it is not necessary to aver per
ronal service: Id.
When the action is founded on a judgment a copy of the judgment
sued on should be filed with the petition, but the neglect so to d4
should be taken advantage of by motion, and cannot be reached 4,
demurrer: Id.
Strictly speaking, a judgment is a contract, and of that class of con-
tracts called specialties but the word contract is not ordinarily used in
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a sense that includes judgments; nor is it generally so used by law
writers; nor is it so used in section twenty of the code of civil proceduro
of 1659: Id.
The sixth sub-division of section eighteenth of the code of IN6S. will
not be given a construction that will absolutely cut off all rights of
action, when the same had not been barred by previous statutes : Id.
Vracation, of void Jdgment-Judgment against Person inside Con-
federate Lines.-A void judgment may be vacated and set a.-ide at any
time, on motion of the defendant, and this though the judgment had
been rendered more than three years before the code of 18(68 took effect:
forman v. Scott, 10 Kans.
Where one, atter the commencement of the late war, voluntarily left
his place of residence within the Union lines, and entered the Con-
rederate lines, and joined the Confederate army, lie cannot avoid pro-
ceedinii. regularly prosecuted against him as an absentee, on the ground
of his inability to return or to hold communication with the place where
the proceedings were had : Id.
LANDLORD AND TENANT.
When, Equity will not Intervene between Landlord and Tnmat.-Where
the relation of landlord and tenant exists, and through failure of the
landlord to take the necessary steps, as provided by law, to terminate
the tenancy at its expiration and summarily eject the tenant holding
over, the tenant has acquired the right to continue the tenancy at suffer-
ance, or for another year, a court of equity will not intervene and oust
him because lie is a bad manager, or is vicious and disagreeable to his
landlord, or is insolvent: Blab v. .Everitt, 36 Md.
MERGER.
Purchase of Equity of Redemption by ihortgagee.-Stated generally,
the law is that when the mortgagee purchases the equity of redemption
of the mortgagor, his mortgage interest is extinguished. But this
general doctrine is subject to qualifications. Mergr is not favored in
equity, and is never allowed unless for special reasons and to promote
the intention of the party: 6los and others v. BoTpe, 8 0. B. Green.
When the equities are subserved by keeping the mortgage alive, and
no injury or injustice is thereby wrought, it is not extinguished: Id.
When the mortgaged premises were afterward conveyed to a mort.ra-
gee. though not purchased by him, and he did not derive, or expect to
derive, any benefit from the conveyance, and it was not his intention
to have his mortgage extinguished, he is entitled to recover the amount
due thereon : Id.
MORTGAGE.
As Collateral Security for Aotes.-Ak mortgagee holding two notes,
secured by one mortgage, can transfer one note and the mortgage, so as
to give that note priority in satisfhction out of the mortgaged property-
1oyes v. White et al., 10 Kans.
An endorsement of the one note, with an assignment of " all the
right, title and interest of the mortgagee in the mortgage" will he
_ufficient in the absence of all circumstances indicating a contrary inten-
tion, to give to the holder of such note priority 
: Id.
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Before protest-damages can be recovered, there must be such demand
and notice as will charge the endorser: Id.
Right of Assignee-.Pledge of Mortgage as Collateral Security for a
ote-Subrogation.-An assignee takes a mortgage subject to all the
equities to which it was liable in the hands of his assignor. And where
the mortgage has been pledged as security for the payment of a note,
he is entitled in a suit for foreclosure, only to a decree for the balance
due on the mortgage after deducting the amount of the note: Kamend
v. Rielbig and others, 8 0. E. Green.
Where the mortgagor has paid the note, and the note and mortgage
have been delivered to him, he is subrogated in the place of the payee
of the note as her assignee, and will be allowed the amount as a credit
on the mortgage: Id.
A deduction allowed by the payee from the amount really due on the
note does not enure to the benefit of the complainant. A receipt being
taken in full of the payee's claim on the bond and mortgage, the mort-
gagor is entitled to a credit on the mortgage for the full amount of the
note: Id.
The bond and mortgage were lawfully pledged by the note. It does
not require a written instrument to assign a bond even at law In
this case a mere delivery of the bond and mortgage would have beeti
sufficient: Id.
This assignment does not come within the provisions of the second
section of the Act March 14th 1863 (Nix. Dig. 613), requiring it to be
in writing. But if it did, the written pledge in this case is sufficient. Id.
That the matter of the note pledging the mortgage as security for the
payment, was a married woman, does not affect the validity of the assign-
ment. Her husband was present when she gave it and approved it: Id.
That the complainant did not know of this assignment does not effect
it: It.
That the mortgagee did not have the bond and mortgage in his hands
for delivery at the time she assigned them, was notice to the assignee
that they were held by some one as owner or claimant. But he was
entitled to no notice; he took them subject to all equities in this respect:
Id.
Attachment Bond-Act of 1864, ch. 306-Impeachment of Mortgage
-Evidence in mitigation of Damages in an Action. for the Illegal Seizure
of Mortgaged Goods-Exsemplary Damages-Measure of Damages.-
The bond required by the Act of 1864, ch. 306, as preliminary to
issuing an attachment, if not executed in conformity with the statute,
is invalid, and the attachment is illegal and void: Wanamaker v. Bowes,
36 Md.
A creditor of a mortgagor not having acquired a lien upon the mort-
gaged goods, by attachment or other valid legal process, will not, in an
action against him by the mortgagee for wrongfully and illegally seizing
the mortgaged property, be permitted merely because he is a creditor
of the mortgagor, to impeach the mortgage as fraudulent as against
creditors, either as a defence to the action, or in mitigation of damages:
Td.
In an action by a mortgagee against a creditor of the mortgagor f.
wrongful and illegal seizure of the mortgaged goods-they ha ,m . ',
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taken under a void attachment-the defendant may prove in mitigation
of' damages, that at the time of the seizure under the attachment, therc
was rent in arrear due upon the premises occupied by the mortgagor. ii,
which the goods were; that after the seizure by the Oheriff, and before
the removal of the goods, there were filed with him by the landlord
notice and affidavit of such rent in arrear, and that in pursuance of such
notice, and of an order of court passed in the attachment case, the
sheriff paid to the landlord, out of the proceeds of the sales of the pro.
perty, the amount of the rent in arrear : Pd.
In an action for an illegal seizure of goods, where there is no evidence
of wanton or malicious wrong on the part of the detondant, exemprlary
damages should not be allowed : Id.
The measure of damages, for an illegal seizure of goods, is to be
determined in accordance with the facts of the particular case : Id.
NUISANCE.
Iinyzn -_ Fact of other similar .Z5isances exisfing in same Lo-
calty.-It is not necessary for the purpose of an injunction that the
odors or gases arising in the carrying on of the defendants' business
should be noxious or unwholesome; it is sufficient if they be so offen-
sive or disagreeable as to render life uncomfortable: Neigs v. _eis.er.
8 0. E. Green.
A mistake in the name of the location of the defendants' works,
whence the nuisance arises, cannot affect the question : Rd.
That the nuisance is not constant does not affect the right of the com-
plainants to protection : Rd.
The complainants' right to relief from the nuisance of the defendants'
works is not affected by the allegation (were it true), that the locality is
surrounded by other nuisances, and dedicated to such purposes: Id.
If there are several nuisances of the like nature surrounding the
complainants, they must seek relief from each separately; they'cannot
be joined in one suit, nor need the suits proceed paripassu : Id.
That the city of New York should have some place where it can
deposit and utilize its filth, and that it has selected the place in this
state, where the defendants' works are carried on, will not compel the
complainants to submit to the injury as damnuim absque injiria. What
place such filth could be taken to, where it would be less injurious than
the place so selected, is not a question for the consideration of this
court: Id.
When the fact of the nuisance is free from doubt, a delay of several
months will not prevent relief by preliminary injunction: Id.
OrFIcEr. See Constitutional Law.
Special Appointments of Commissioners for a single Case-How far
pubilic Oficers.-Persons specially appointed by the court to act upon a
single petition for a highway, are county commissioners, so far as that
ease is concerned, and are public officers, who are required by the Con-
stitution to take and subscribe the oath of allegiance and the oath of
office, before entering upon the discharge of their duties : Mentworth
et al. v. Farmington, et al., 51 N. H.
When commissioners were thus specially appointed to act on a single
petition, and were sworn only to the faithful performance of their duty,
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and a certificate of such oath was returned to the office of the clerk of
the court, as required by statute, before they entered upon the discharge
of their duties: Held, that this was constructive notice to all parties of
all facts contained in said certificate, and that any party who would
object to the qualifications of the commissioners, must do so before the
hearing, or his objection will be held to be waived: Id.
When the commissioners make a report to this court upon such peti-
tion, and objection is made to its acceptance, on the ground that the
commissioners were not duly qualified; the court will consider the objec-
tion, and it' they find it well founded, will set aside or recommit the
report, provided there is any party in court, in a position to raise the
objection. It is not enough in such case to say that they were commis-
sioners defacto. The case might be different if their report had been
accepted, and some question of their qualification afterwards arose be
tween other parties: Id.
PARTNERSHIP.
Land bought with Partnership Funds-Bil in Equity for Account.-
Land bought with partnership funds, although the title be taken in the
name of one of the partners, will be treated in equity as partnership
property: Deveney v. Mahoney, 8 0. E. Green.
The same principle applies to improvements made with partnership
funds, on the separate property of one of the partners: Id.
It would seem that it is not necessary that judgment should be first
obtained against the copartner in whose name the title is vested, to enable
a partner to maintain a suit in equity for an account, and to have the
property declared partnership assets : Id.
The rule that a fraudulent or voluntary transfer of property cannot
be contested by a creditor at large, but only by one who has obtained a
judgment that would be a lien upon the property if not transferred, is
well established, but does not apply to one partner calling on another to
account: Id.
Where a part of the purchase-money of the property alleged to have
been fraudulently conveyed by a partner, remains unpaid at the time of
filing a bill for account against him, the grantee, as to that amount, is
not a purchaser for value, without notice, and the property is liable te
that amount, provided so much of the partnership funds have been
expended thereon: Id.
RAILROAD.
Action for Negl ence-Damages-Evidence.-In an action by an
individual against a railway company, for injuries claimed to have beer
caused through the negligence of the servants of the railway company,
in running a train over the plaintiff while he was walking on the track
of the railway company, which track the plaintiff claimed was located
on a public street in the city of Leavenworth, it is competent for the
plaintiff, with proper allegations in his petition, to show that the place
where the accident occurred was on a public street, either in law or in
fact; and if he shows either, he will not be a trespasser upon the rights
of the railway company, so as to relieve the railway company from ex-
ercising reasonable and ordinary care and diligence, so as to avoid injur
ing him. In such a case the railway company must run their trains
with reference to him and to all others who may rightfully be upon the
street: K. P. R. W. Co. v. Pointer, 10 Kans.
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The plaintiff may also show in such a case (with proper allegatiens in
his petition), the nature and extent of his injuries, his suffi rings, the
length of time he was disabled, the value of his time, his expenses in
being cured, his condition with respect to the injuries at the time of the
trial, his prospective condition, or rather the effect the injuries will in
all probability have upon him in the future; and this prospective effect
may be proved by the professional opinion of the physician and surgeon
who attended him, or by any other competent physician and surgeon
who has made a sufficient examination of the injuries: Id.
It was not competent in such a case, for the purpose of showing the
injuries, or their character or extent, or for the purpose of enhancing
the damages which the plaintiff expected to recover, for the plain-
tiff to prove his pecuniary or social condition, whether he was rich or
poor, married or single, or whether he had a fiamily or not : Id.
Hearsay testimony is incompetent, and for the court to admit hearsay
testimony, which tends to prove that the servants of the railway com-
pany were negligent in running their train, whereby the injuries com-
plained of were caused, is a material error, for which the judgment of
the court below against the railway company, founded in part on such
testimony, must be reversed: Id.
RESIDENT. See Statutes.
SALE. See Frauds, Statute of.
STATUTES. See Constitutional Law.
Rules of Constructon.-A leading and controlling rule in the construc-
tion of statutes, is to interpret them according to the true meaning and
Intent. To ascertain this intent, it is the duty of the court to find, by
established rules, what was the fair, natural and probable intent of the
legislature: The People et al. v. Schoonmaker et a., 63 Barb.
For this purpose the language employed in the act is first to be re-
sorted to. If the words employed are free from ambiguity and doubt,
and express plainly and distinctly the intent, according to the most natu-
ral import of the language, there is no occasion to look elsewhere: Id.
But where the meaning of words is doubtful, and where it is seen
that the same words have different meanings when employed under dif-
ferent circumstances, or to effect different objects, resort may be had tc
extrinsic circumstances, and the courts may seek for that intent in every
iegitimate way: Id.
Corporations-Resi(dents.-Independent of the cases making them
"inhabitants" and "residents," by construction, for certain purposes,
the natural, ordinary and literal construction of the words "residents
of a town," would not include corporations, especially those whose places
ol business were elsewhere: Id.
The word "residents" occurring in the Constitution or in a statute,
ordinarily means an individual -a citizen-and does not mean a corpora-
non : .d.
SUBROGATION. See Mortgaqe.
